Direct and indirect costs in Islamic finance – opportunities for research by Mustaffa Kamil, Nazrol Kamil
1 
 
Direct and Indirect Costs in Islamic Finance – Opportunities for Research 
 
 
Nazrol Kamil Mustaffa Kamil 
Department of Finance, Kulliyyah of Economics and Management Sciences 
International Islamic University Malaysia 
nazrol@iium.edu.my 
 
 
Conference Paper 
10th Foundation of Islamic Finance Conference (FIFC) 
Sunway University, 28 November 2019 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This is an exploratory conceptual paper that attempts to highlight some potential 
research areas related to the aspects of direct and indirect costs in Islamic finance. 
Questions on whether indirect costs should be included in compensation calculation and 
in computing mudarabah profit, as well as the issue for indirect costs in the context of 
Islamic banking windows, are deliberated upon. The paper articulates a comparison of 
costs of Islamic banks vis-à-vis conventional banks in terms of cost of funds, general cost 
efficiencies, regulatory costs, asset-liability management and risk management costs, 
operational costs and costs of bad debt. The risk of non-Shari’ah compliance and how it 
may impact costs are also highlighted. Finally, the paper briefly discusses some cost 
aspects relevant to Islamic capital markets. 
 
 
Definition of Direct and Indirect Costs 
 
A direct cost is a price that can be directly attributed to the production of specific goods 
or provision of specific services. This direct cost can be traced to the stipulated cost 
object which may be a product, service or business division or department. Direct costs 
are typically variable costs, in that their quantum varies with level of production, 
although some fixed costs may be classified as direct costs (if their incurrence can be 
exclusively assigned to a single identified cost object). 
 
Indirect costs are expenditures that cannot be directly associated with a particular cost 
object (product, service, function or project). Indirect costs can be either fixed or variable. 
The nature of these costs is that they are shared by two or more cost objects, and 
apportioning these costs between or among cost objects is not feasible, cumbersome or 
cannot be done cost-effectively. Examples include shared overheads and general 
administrative expenses. 
 
In the context of finance, the primary direct cost is cost of funds. In banking, a commercial 
bank sources funds from depositors and from money markets, and interest paid to these 
providers of funds represents a direct cost. In providing loans or financing to their 
customers, commercial banks should reasonably expect some fraction of those 
receivables to be uncollectible or culminate in (written-off) bad debt. These can also be 
considered as direct costs. In addition, there are certain costs in complying with 
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regulatory requirements – such as statutory reserve requirements (portion of sourced 
funds that cannot be loaned out or disbursed) and capital adequacy requirements (costs 
of maintaining prudent levels of capital). Also, commercial banks typically maintain an 
adequate level of liquid assets to meet daily operational demands. These do not earn a 
return to the bank and hence is also a (direct) cost to the bank. 
 
Indirect costs for a commercial bank are typically personnel costs (salaries, wages, 
allowances, bonuses, commissions, retirement benefit contributions, and other employee 
benefits) and overhead expenses (marketing and promotion, depreciation of fixed assets, 
information technology expenses, rental, security costs, insurance, utilities, office 
maintenance, and incidental expenses). 
 
 
Direct and Indirect Costs in Islamic Banking 
 
Articulating the idea of direct and indirect costs in contemporary Islamic banking 
produces an interesting observation. From a Shari’ah-compliance standpoint, the 
propagated idea is that Islamic banks are in the trading business. Islamic banks are said 
to purchase assets [for example, machinery under a Murabahah to the Purchase Orderer 
facility, or, crude palm oil under a Commodity Murabahah (Tawarruq) arrangement] 
which are subsequently sold to their customers under deferred payment terms at a pre-
determined mark-up. Hence, direct cost here would be the price paid by the bank to 
acquire the asset in question (the machinery or crude palm oil, as in the example given). 
As per AAOIFI standards, the bank is allowed to include associated costs such as 
installation, transportation, storage and insurance. The bank’s personnel costs are, 
however, not allowed to be included as the base cost (and presumably classified as 
indirect cost to the bank) [see AAOIFI Shari’ah Standard No. 8 Murabahah 4/4]. Similarly, 
Bank Negara Malaysia’s Shari’ah parameters on Murabahah stipulate that indirect costs 
shall not be included as part of acquisition costs [see Shari’ah Advisory Council of Bank 
Negara Malaysia’s Shari’ah Parameter Reference on Murabahah – Section 5, No. 29]. 
 
On the other hand, from a financial reporting viewpoint, contemporary Islamic banks are 
deemed to be essentially money-lenders. This can be seen in the manner of reporting in 
an Islamic bank’s Profit and Loss Statement. “Income derived from investment of 
depositors’ funds and from investment account funds” [comparable to “interest received” 
in conventional banks] are offset with “income attributable to depositors and investment 
account holders” [comparable to “interest paid” in conventional banks] to arrive at net 
income. Personnel and overheads are subsequently deducted as indirect costs. Thus 
essentially to the accounting profession, direct costs for an Islamic bank is cost of funds, 
and not cost of acquired assets subsequently sold on credit. 
 
This dichotomy in treatment can be explained as follows. In order to secure Shari’ah-
compliance sign-off by Shari’ah scholars, the idea that Islamic banks are buying and 
selling tangible (for the most part) assets is mooted, and this is evidenced by the use of 
sale contracts instead of loan contracts. Shari’ah scholars, the gatekeepers of 
contemporary Islamic finance, buy-in into this idea and pronounce that such 
documentary differentiation is sufficient to legitimize such practice from an Islamic legal 
perspective. 
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The accounting fraternity, on the other hand, has collectively adopted a different view. 
They presumably take into account a number of realities. Firstly, the assets are not 
acquired by the bank before-hand, meaning that the bank only purchases the asset in 
question after effectively securing the subsequent re-sale to the bank’s customer. 
Secondly, the bank does not, in effect, assume any (non-trivial) risks of asset ownership. 
Thirdly, the quantum of mark-up typically culminates in financing rates which are 
comparable to conventional interest rates. For at least these reasons, and putting in 
operation the accounting principle of “substance over form”, contemporary financial 
reporting of Islamic banks has taken the form of that for money-lenders, albeit of the 
Islamic variety. 
 
 
Incorporation of Indirect Costs in Computing Compensation for Case of Payment 
Delinquency 
 
The general view of contemporary scholars is that in the event of payment delinquency, 
the bank would be allowed to impose a penalty or compensation, save cases of genuine 
debtor insolvency.  The matter of whether this said penalty or compensation is to be 
recognized as income or to be channelled to charity is a separate matter, subject to 
differing Shari’ah opinions. The bases for allowing such a practice of charges for cases of 
delayed or non-payment are to discourage intentional evasion of payment obligation by 
the debtor as well as to protect the interests and rights of the creditor. 
 
Notwithstanding this, an issue of potential debate is, in computing the “compensation”, 
wherein the actual cost borne by the bank in the provision of the financing facility in 
question is of paramount concern, should the bank be also allowed to include indirect 
costs? There are differing opinions here. While AAOIFI and a fatwa of Al-Rajhi Bank 
resolved that only direct costs can be considered, a fatwa of Dubai Islamic Bank allows for 
both direct and indirect costs (as cited by Mohd Noor and Haron, 2016). In the case of the 
latter, it was argued that the bank would incur the costs and would have an effect on the 
bank, regardless of whether they were direct or indirect in nature, and hence should be 
entitled to recover them. More in-depth research is arguably justified to ascertain the 
efficacy of both resolutions. 
 
 
Indirect Costs in Islamic Banking Windows 
 
Indirect costs such as personnel costs and shared overheads give rise to an issue in the 
case of conventional banks that offer Islamic banking products and services via Islamic 
banking “windows”. It is conceivable that a significant portion of indirect costs are shared 
between a conventional bank’s Islamic windows operation and the bank’s conventional 
business. Some personnel may serve both Islamic and conventional banking clientele. A 
banking group’s internal functions and services such as human resources, information 
technology, risk management and general administration, to name but a few, are typically 
shared between the bank’s conventional business and its Islamic windows. They typically 
share physical resources like office buildings, office equipment and fittings, and 
information systems. It may not be feasible or cost-effective to apportion usage of these 
shared resources between the two facets of the group’s business, purely for reporting 
purposes. 
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As such, it would not be practicable to ascertain the complete cost-picture for the Islamic 
windows operation for the bank in question (net of indirect costs). This represents a 
limitation to financial performance reporting for the bank’s Islamic windows. At best, 
users of financial accounting information would have to settle for making a mental note of 
this and limit their analysis to net income before indirect costs (essentially focusing on 
“net interest margin”). Research on comparative cost efficiency of banks would have to be 
reminded of this constraint. At worst, non-inclusion of apportioned shared costs would 
result in under-reporting of costs for a given Islamic windows operation and produce 
inflated profitability and hence inaccurate performance assessments. Ignoring the Islamic 
window’s fair share of overheads would be a form of subsidization of the Islamic banking 
business by the conventional bank. 
 
This is not an issue for full-fledged Islamic banks nor is it relevant to banking groups that 
have set up a separate subsidiary for their Islamic banking business (as a separate set of 
accounts would be mandated hence apportionment of indirect costs would take place).  
 
 
Indirect Costs in Mudarabah 
 
The Shari’ah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia has resolved 1 that indirect 
expenses such as overheads, staff salaries, depreciation of fixed assets, general 
administrative expenses and IT-related costs shall not be deducted from the mudarabah 
fund. In a sense, this means that only direct costs are to be taken into account in 
determining mudarabah profit that is subject to distribution between rabbal mal and 
mudarib (the depositor and the bank, respectively, in the case of mudarabah deposits) 
according to the pre-agreed profit sharing ratio. The rationale for this stance is that the 
bank-mudarib would factor in its indirect costs in negotiating the profit sharing ratio with 
the depositor-rabbal mal and that the bank would indirectly be recouping fair 
apportionment of related indirect costs from its received share of distributed profits. This 
approach is also said to avoid possibility of cost manipulation at the expense of the rabbal 
mal. 
 
The alternative approach would have been to allow the deduction of indirect costs, 
according to a pre-agreed set of guidelines and stipulations. However, it was presumably 
felt that this would be more cumbersome to manage and potentially more susceptible to 
mismanagement or manipulation. There is some degree of information asymmetry 
between rabbal mal and mudarib and narrowing this gap can be costly and time-
consuming. That said, one should also consider the possibility of over-compensation in 
the form of profit sharing ratios overly-favouring the bank-mudarib to provide for more 
room to recover indirect expenses. There is opportunity for research here to establish 
which between the two approaches results in a fairer and more cost-effective solution.  
 
 
  
                                                          
1 During its 82nd meeting, dated 17 February 2009. 
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Banking Costs – Islamic Versus Conventional 
  
Cost of funds 
 
Some arguments can be made to moot the idea that Islamic banking cost of funds can be 
lower than that of its conventional counterpart, at least theoretically. Islamic deposits 
structured using loan-based contracts like wadiah and qard would be subjected to only 
discretionary hibah (gift) so as to avoid being construed as riba. A captive market of 
Muslim depositors can be said to tolerate little or no return on their deposits, on the 
belief that consistent return on deposits would be tantamount to riba. In addition, in 
certain markets, the government may make available to Islamic banks sources of funds at 
lower cost in a bid to promote Islamic banking. All these provide avenues for lower cost 
of funds for Islamic banks vis-à-vis conventional ones. There are of course offsetting 
considerations. The depositors of Islamic banks are made up of non-Muslims as well. 
Islamic banks face displaced commercial risk – the risk of withdrawal of funds by 
depositors – in the event that realized returns do not meet expectations. 
 
Economies of scale 
 
There is popular rhetoric that larger banks have superior economies of scale in being able 
to spread their fixed overheads over a larger asset and revenue base. Given that generally 
Islamic banks tend to be smaller than their conventional rivals, this would seem to imply 
that conventional banks achieve greater cost efficiencies compared to Islamic banks. 
However, there is empirical research which offers evidence that this may not necessarily 
be the case. Ariff et al. (2011) found that the cost efficiency differences between Islamic 
and conventional banks were not statistically discernible. The same can be said when 
comparisons were made between small and big banks. 
 
Regulatory costs 
 
It can be said that generally standards on capital adequacy requirements were designed 
with mainstream banking systems and infrastructure in mind. In this regard, Islamic 
banks are at times, unfairly penalized. Profit-and-risk sharing instruments like 
mudarabah and musharakah when employed as modes of financing are typically assigned 
significantly higher risk weights. The larger the risk-weighted assets, the more capital the 
Islamic bank needs to hold to comply with regulatory standards. This implies a 
comparatively higher regulatory cost. 
 
Such a challenge stems from a mismatch in risk profiles in the intermediation equation. In 
a number of jurisdictions, mudarabah-based deposits carry explicit or implicit capital 
guarantees with assured (albeit non-contractual) positive returns. These deposits, when 
used to finance mudarabah-based financing, culminates in that aforementioned risk 
mismatch which in turn translates into the higher cost of maintaining additional 
regulatory capital. In response to this, Islamic banks typically abandon the idea of profit-
and-risk sharing as a financing approach. Evidently, mudarabah and musharakah 
financing only make up token fractions of an Islamic bank’s financing portfolio. 
Consequently, there is non-realization of the two-tier mudarabah model envisioned by 
early pioneers of Islamic finance. 
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Interestingly, if the idea of mudarabah was more genuinely applied to mobilize the 
Islamic bank’s source of funds, such regulatory costs would be reduced if not totally 
disappear. If funds are sourced to be strictly risk capital from the point of view of 
“depositors”, that is, no capital or return guarantees, when these funds are channelled to 
economic ventures that result in losses, the said losses “pass-through” the Islamic bank. 
In other words, such “depositors” ultimately and exclusively bear the risks of losses. 
Under such a scenario, the Islamic bank needs to hold no regulatory capital. 
 
The new investment account – A game changer 
 
This was presumably the motivation that led to the introduction of the new “investment 
account” gazetted by Malaysia’s Islamic Financial Services Act (IFSA) 2013. These 
investment accounts now carry no capital guarantees (including no coverage under 
deposit takaful schemes). In a sense, with such investment accounts, the “cost of funds” 
would be higher, to compensate investment account holders who now bear much higher 
risks. However, it is important to note that this cost is not fixed ex ante. Nonetheless, such 
a cost would be offset by lower regulatory costs as well as lower asset-liability 
management (ALM) costs. In addition to earning a share of profits in the mudarabah 
scheme (as mudarib), the Islamic bank can also earn arranger fees (via the wakalah 
contract). This represents a major game change – with investment account holders now 
shouldering the bulk of investment risks and Islamic banks assuming the role of 
facilitator and executor. This is a relatively new development in the Islamic banking 
landscape and it remains to be seen how well the market is embracing the change. It 
should be noted however, that at present, much of the financing to economic ventures are 
contracted on the basis of fixed-return schemes (such as commodity murabahah) instead 
of profit-and-risk sharing arrangements like mudarabah and musharakah. Under this new 
scheme of things, the Islamic bank effectively transfers risk to investment account 
holders. Notwithstanding this, the Islamic bank still bears the risk of loss in reputation as 
well as the risk of potential litigation in the event of proven negligence or fraud, and these 
represent indirect costs to the Islamic bank albeit difficult to quantify. 
 
Asset-Liability Management (ALM) and Risk management 
 
At times, the banking business is a precarious balancing between its assets and liabilities. 
Banks often push their leverage to limits allowed by regulators to maximize return on 
equity. Such a business model exposes banks to obvious risks. In addition, banks also 
need to manage their liquidity to deal with daily cash flow movements while 
simultaneously maximizing returns. In this regard, Islamic banks are said to face the 
challenge of insufficient liquidity management instruments. The acceptability of some 
proposed instruments from a Shari’ah standpoint as well as the depth of markets, are 
some reasons attributing to this predicament. By and large, there is reluctance by 
Shari’ah scholars to sign off on contemporary financial derivative instruments. Thus, 
Islamic banks have to resort to more complicated financially-engineered solutions. These 
are customized over-the-counter negotiated arrangements which tend to be more costly 
to the bank. For example, the use of currency derivatives are common, to manage foreign 
currency exchange rate risk. Common instruments such as currency forwards, futures, 
options and swaps are generally deemed non-Shari’ah compliant as they entail the 
exchange of two ribawi items not on spot terms. As a workable alternative, some banks 
have engineered a synthetic currency forward contract using combinations of commodity 
murabahah transactions and unilateral binding promise (wa’d). Such a solution is not 
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only at least marginally more costly, it introduces more complexity. Opacity in 
transactions makes risk management more challenging and costly (to do 
comprehensively). One lesson that can be drawn from the 2008 Global Financial Crisis is 
to not underestimate, let alone ignore, the potential presence and impact of “unknown 
unknowns” or sometimes termed “risk risk”. 
 
Additional operational costs 
 
The fact that, contemporary Islamic finance has largely resorted to reverse engineering of 
conventional product offerings using commutative (exchange) contracts like sale and 
leasing, implies higher operational costs. Compared to similar mainstream-finance 
transactions, Islamic financial products typically involve more transactions and more 
transacting parties. All else being equal, this suggests higher operational costs. For 
example, the commodity murabahah (tawarruq) involves paying brokerage fees and 
charges to platforms like Bursa Suq Al-Sila’ 2 and London Metals Exchange. Additional 
documentation also attracts added legal, administrative as well as auditing costs. It 
should be noted also that Islamic banks have to incur costs of financial engineering – 
paying product development consultants to construct instruments that would garner 
Shari’ah compliant status. Beyond that, Islamic banks have to maintain a remunerated 
Shari’ah board as well as sustain a Shari’ah department or unit in line with more 
stringent and demanding recent developments in the Shari’ah governance framework in 
some jurisdictions such as Malaysia. 
 
Costs of bad debt 
 
It would be interesting to dwell into the question of which – Islamic or conventional 
banks – would have higher costs of bad debt. On a theoretical plane, it could be argued 
that Islamic banks would be more forgiving – seeing that Islam advocates the giving of 
reprieve to those in difficulty. Whether Islamic banks are dealing with genuinely 
insolvent debtors or those simply wanting to exploit is a separate matter. There is a case 
to be made that Islamic banks may have to contend with higher rates of non-performing 
financing. On the other hand, the presence of religiosity could work in the Islamic bank’s 
favour. Customers can be made to feel more inclined to honour contractual commitments 
using religious or moral persuasion. In a World Bank working paper, Bursztyn et al. 
(2105) conducted a field experiment and found that when late-paying credit card 
customers received text messages quoting Islamic religious text, repayment improved by 
20% and that this moral appeal was more effective than substantial financial incentive (in 
the form of cash rebate). Such an empirical observation presents itself as an opportunity 
for Islamic banks to rein in payment delinquency and reduce costs associated with bad 
debt. 
 
The unquantifiable cost of non-Shari’ah compliance risk 
 
One “cost” that is unique to Islamic financial institutions is that of the risk of non-Shari’ah 
compliance. This added dimension of operational risk represents the potential of 
deficiencies in execution of transactions which lead to pronouncements of non-Shari’ah 
compliance, resulting from self-discovery or external Shari’ah compliance audits. In such 
                                                          
2 RM15 per RM1 million (22 days and above) trading fee, access fee of RM100 per token per month, plus 
any applicable taxes 
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events, the categorical “non-compliant income” would have to be channelled to charity as 
a means of “cleansing” and thus represents a cost to the bank. A more serious type of non-
Shari’ah compliance risk is when products or practices that were initially or previously 
declared as Shari’ah compliant subsequently have their Shari’ah compliance questioned. 
In recent times, there have been a number of legal cases where the Shari’ah compliance of 
Islamic commercial contracts has been subjected to scrutiny. For example, in Affin Bank v 
Zulkifli Abdullah (2006) 3 MLJ 67, the validity of the Bay’ Bithaman Ajil (BBA) contract 
was debated. Another infamous case was that of The Investment Dar Company versus 
Blom Development Bank, where the former put forth a defence that the previously 
contracted upon wakalah agreement was in fact not in compliance with the Shari’ah. Most 
recently, the case of JRI Resources Sdn Bhd v Kuwait Finance House centred on the issue 
of which authority would prevail in deciding permissibility of practice in Islamic finance 
(and in a sense, Shari’ah compliance) – the Shari’ah Advisory Council (SAC) of Bank 
Negara Malaysia (BNM) or civil courts. Notwithstanding the prevailing ruling from these 
cases, their occurrences highlight the potential for non-Shari’ah compliance risk. This 
risk, when realized, incurs litigation costs. More importantly, it could be argued that 
uncertainty over Shari’ah compliance and possibility of it being questioned in courts of 
law in future, adds a risk premium which in turn could increase the cost of raising funds 
via Islamic financial instruments. Such a “cost” however, would be difficult to quantify 
and report.    
 
 
Costs in Islamic Capital Markets 
 
Islamic equities 
 
Shari’ah stock screening involves the process of identifying economic sectors which are 
deemed non-compliant from an Islamic perspective. The sectors typically include 
conventional finance and insurance, gambling and gaming, production and sale of 
alcoholic beverages, tobacco and some forms of impermissible entertainment. In addition, 
financial ratios are computed and applied to limit the quantum of debt financing, interest 
income and level of cash and receivables. As a result of this process of Shari’ah stock 
screening, a universe of stocks investable by Muslim investors is arrived at. The resulting 
Islamic equity portfolio is unmistakeably a form of a constrained portfolio – comparable 
to modern day socially responsible investing (SRI) portfolios or portfolios constructed by 
ethical funds. Modern portfolio theory posits that such a portfolio would have sub-
optimal levels of portfolio diversification, given that certain stocks and sectors are 
inaccessible. This in turn, may affect risk-adjusted return performance of the said 
portfolios. In other words, at least of a theoretical plane, there is a diversification “cost” of 
Shari’ah compliance. 
 
Research works that deal in depth with the diversification perspective in articulating the 
comparison between constrained portfolios and mainstream portfolios are few and far 
between. Hoepner (2010) argues that it is wrong to make an inescapable conclusion that 
constrained portfolios such as SRI-based ones will always have worsened levels of 
portfolio diversification. A simple theoretical model was developed with three primary 
drivers of portfolio diversification – (i) number of stocks, (ii) correlation of stocks, and 
(iii) average specific risk of stocks. While ethically screened portfolios will nearly always 
lose out in terms of the first two drivers, it may not necessarily be the case for the third. 
In fact, it was argued that many SRI funds would typically have lower average 
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idiosyncratic risks, even to the point of offsetting any disadvantage they would have in 
terms of the first two drivers. This is especially the case when positive screening takes 
place (actively looking for best-in-class investments) as opposed to merely negative 
exclusionary screening (just avoiding irresponsible firms). Borrowing the author’s “eggs 
in baskets” analogy, the argument is that socially-responsible investing may end up with 
fewer baskets to work with, but the quality of the selected baskets could be higher. 
 
There is a clear dearth in empirical research addressing this perspective in the case of 
Islamic equities. Kamil et al. (2019) offers early empirical evidence that it is not a 
foregone conclusion that Islamic portfolios are inescapably handicapped in terms of 
portfolio diversification. It is felt that more research is warranted to shed more light on 
this issue. 
 
Sukuk 
 
Sukuk markets today can be characterized as having relatively thin trading. Many Islamic 
financial institutions, Islamic funds and other investors with Islamic mandates are 
restricted to only Shari’ah compliant securities. This being the case, demand often 
outstrips supply, evidenced by frequent oversubscription of Sukuk issuances. To maintain 
their asset portfolios, these aforementioned investors of Sukuk typically adopt a buy-and-
hold strategy with their Sukuk investments. This explains the lack of trading in secondary 
markets. It has been argued that such thin trading may impose a liquidity premium 
factored into Sukuk pricing. This represents an irony given that it is posited that generally 
demand for Sukuk is greater than its supply. Such an idiosyncrasy may well be worth 
researching. 
 
Apart from this liquidity premium “cost”, it is worth mentioning that Sukuk markets are 
also exposed to non-Shari’ah compliant risk, in line with earlier discussions. The recent 
default of the Dana Gas Sukuk is a case in point. Sukuk investors inadvertently assume the 
risk of Sukuk issuer defaulters entering into defence the argument of non-Shari’ah 
compliance. A more distant (in year 2008) yet impactful example was when the then-
chairman of AAOIFI’s Shari’ah Board Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Usmani was quoted by 
media to have said that a large portion of Sukuk issued at the time were not Shari’ah 
compliant. The statement sent shockwaves across the industry and Sukuk issuances 
dipped significantly in the years that followed. These highlight a potential albeit hidden 
cost of Sukuk issuance. 
 
Islamic venture capital 
 
Anwer et al. (2019) argued that a number of challenges are faced by players in the Islamic 
venture capital market. Investors may be perturbed by the relative lack of transparency 
and absence of uniform legal framework in Islamic markets. Protection of intellectual 
property rights and patents in these markets are also in question. Effective mechanisms 
for dispute resolution and specific laws or regulations to protect rights of contracting 
parties may not be well developed or even absent. Entrepreneurial development 
programs to enhance critical competencies to produce entrepreneurs of high calibre may 
be lacking. As a whole, there considerations may well increase the cost of raising venture 
capital funds. 
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Conclusion 
 
A summary of the issues discussed in this paper, presented as research opportunities, are 
listed below. 
i. Should there be consistency between the manner in which Islamic financial 
transactions are designed and contracted, and the way these transactions are 
recorded and reported? 
ii. Should indirect costs be included in the calculation of compensation for payment 
delinquency? 
iii. How should we account for indirect costs for Islamic banking windows? 
iv. Should indirect costs be deducted in computing mudarabah profit? 
v. Is the quantum of cost of funds similar between Islamic and conventional banks? 
vi. Are there significant differences in the cost efficiency of Islamic banks versus 
conventional banks? 
vii. Do Islamic banks have higher regulatory costs? Does this change with the new 
IFSA 2013 investment accounts? 
viii. Are asset-liability management and risk management more costly to implement 
with Islamic banks? 
ix. Do Islamic banks have materially higher operational costs? 
x. Do Islamic banks face higher costs of bad debt compared to conventional banks? 
xi. To what extent does the risk of non-Shari’ah compliance increase the cost of doing 
business in Islamic finance? 
xii. Is there a diversification cost of Shari’ah compliance in Islamic equities? 
xiii. Is there a liquidity premium in Sukuk and how does it affect Sukuk pricing and 
costs of Sukuk issuances? 
xiv. Is the cost of raising venture capital in Islamic markets significantly higher? 
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